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PIRACY CASES IN TBlE SUPREME COURT
JAMES J. LENoIR*
In ancient times piracy was almost the only maritime undertak-
ing of international scope; and, on occasion, even nations participated
in acts of a piratical nature. With the development of maritime
commerce, however, there was almost a complete reversal of the
point of view with which the practice was regarded.' By the latter
part of the fifteenth century it was an accepted rule that piracy in
any form was contrary to all rules of seafaring trade and that the
pirate was thus the common enemy of all nations.' Practically all
of the earlier writers accepted this viewpoint, which thereupon be-
came an alleged rule of law which judges in most cases accepted and
applied.8
In spite of the antiquity of the subject, however, there does not
seem to be any acceptable or comprehensive work on piracy., This
is all the more to be regretted since piracy as a crime is well worth
attention today. It is by no means obsolete, yet its place in legal
theory has never been stated and its actual definition in substantive
law is still open to argument.
There are some who deny the present importance of piracy and
regard it as a matter of historical interest only. They claim that such
piracy as is still to be found is chiefly piracy made such by special
conventions, or by municipal law,5 and that it has little or no sig-
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi.
'See Whatley, A. T., "Historical Sketch of the Law of Piracy," 3 Law
Magazine and Review (N. S.) (1874), 536, 618.
2This view appeared to be common in England with the passage of the
"Offense at Sea Act," 1536. 28 Henry VIII, C. 15. See 6 Holdsworth, A His-
tory of English Law (1924), 400-401; 1 Russell, Crimes and Misdemeanors
(8th ed., 1923), 261 ff.; 3 Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed., 1932), secs. 2239-
2248; 3 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833),
52-58; 1 Kent, J., Commentaries on American Law (14th ed., 1896), 183-187;
Marshall's speech, delivered when he was a member of Congress, 5 Wheaton
(U. S. Reports) Appendix, 7-8.
8 Cf. Story's opinion in United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153 (1820) ; Rex
v. Dawson, 8 William III, 1695, 13 State Trials 451 (1816); and Rex v. Green,
4 Anne, 1705, 14 State Trials 1199.
4Draft Convention and Comment on Piracy, 26 American Journal Interna-
tional Law (Supplement, 1932), 743-885.
5
"The infrequency of the offence in modern times is no doubt the reason
why its nature has not been more precisely settled." 6 Holdsworth, op. cit., 401.
See, also, Cleminson, H. M., "Laws of Maritime Jurisdiction in Time of
Peace with Special Reference to Territorial Waters," 6 British Yearbook of
International Law (1925), 144-158. In this article it is said that the obsolete-
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nificance in international law. But recent investigations and research
do not bear out this claim.6 It is true that certain forms of piracy
have disappeared, for example, that connected with the slave trade.
But piratical undertakings are quite common, even under present cir-
cumstances, in certain regions of the world, especially in the rivers
and bays of some of the more backward nations.7 It is a matter of
common knowledge that pirates have infested Chinese waters for
some time, and have been a menace to maritime trade there. This may
cause intervention by those powers interested in the safety of the
China trade. Foreign steamers in Chinese waters (except the great
ocean liners that do not take third-class Chinese passengers) take
every precaution to protect themselves from pirates. Each has a
steel barrier erected between the third-class and the rest of the ship,
and at concerted signals these steel gates are shut tight. No Chinese
is ever allowed forward of them. This is because dire experience
shows that any number of third-class Chinese passengers may be dis-
guised pirates. It is not merely river banditry; it is high seas
banditry.8
It cannot be denied that piracy cases may easily arise again
and do in some instances appear directly or indirectly before inter-
national and municipal tribunals.9 Piracy is, moreover, dealt with
in the criminal statutes of most nations, ° which upon examination
from either a national or international viewpoint, show certain well-
defined developments. Not only are municipal laws of piracy less
ness of piracy is one reason why the United States has refrained from par-
ticipating in drawing up conventions upon piracy. See Kenny, C. S., Outlines
of Criminal Law (1933), 332.
6Instead, it appears that piracy is today a matter of concern both to
municipal and international law. See Matsuda's Draft Provisions for the
Suppression of Piracy, League of Nations Document C. 196 M. 70, 1927, V.,
119; 26 Am. Jour. Int. Law (Supp.) 873. Roumanian Draft for the Sup-
pression of Piracy, 1926; League of Nations Document C. 196 M. 70, 1927, V.,
220-221. Dickinson states that although "the occasions for invoking its rules
are less frequent now than formerly, it may still be made a potent factor in
preventing lawlessness upon the seas. It belongs emphatically to the law in
reserve rather than to the law in history." "Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?",
38 Harvard Law Review (1924-1925), 354.
7Scrutton, L. J., called this "internal piracy." China Navigation Co., Ltd.
v. Attorney-General, infra note 9.
8For a description of modern piracy in Chinese waters, see Steep, T.,
"Warriors and Pirates of Modern China," 59 Travel (1932), 45-46. See, also,
Pella, V, 'La Ripression de la Piraterie," Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours
(1926), V, 145, 163.
9See China Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Attorney-General, (1932), 2 K. B. 197;
People v. Lol-Lo and Saraw, 43 P. I. (Reports) 19 (1922); Judgment No. 9-
Lotus Case, Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A, No. 10, opin-
ions of Judges Moore and Finlay.
lOSee "Piracy Laws of Various Countries," compiled by Stanley Morrison,
26 Am. four. Int. Law (Supp.), 889-1013.
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severe at the present time than they were even a hundred years ago,
but additional offenses have also been added to the old accepted con-
cept of acts of piratical nature.1 These developments in the field
of municipal law, taken with the recent efforts to codify the rules of
piracy may serve as ample evidence of widespread international in-
terest in the subject, and undoubtedly show that law is still regarded
as a necessary preventive of piratical undertakings. Suggestions
have been made that the League of Nations codify the rules of piracy;
and actual attempts at such codification have been made by the Har-
vard Research in International Law, and other organizations'
2
Not only is piracy a subject of present concern, but its impor-
tance will probably increase, both in international law and municipal
law. It would appear that by the development of rapid means of
transportation upon the high seas and the improvement of air navi-
gation, there may be new opportunities for depredati6ns, perhaps on
a smaller scale than those of two centuries ago, but surely harmful
enough to warrant the enforcement of laws to prevent them. It could
hardly be questioned that a new type of piracy may make its appear-
ance. It was probably the anticipation of this fact that led some
writers to advocate the extension of international law piracy to air
navigation.1 3  In fact, municipal laws have extended the crime by
adding any number of offenses to it until at present it is in marked
contrast to the term "piracy" as defined by Lord Stowell, Justice
Story, and other early English and American jurists.
Some confusion has arisen because of the use of the two terms:
international law piracy and municipal law piracy. The rule was
formulated rather late in the history of the subject that any robbery
or depredation committed upon the high seas for private gain con-
stitutes the offense.'4  Writers on public law, as well as jurists and
publicists,' 5 have generally accepted this rule as one of customary
international law to be enforced by the courts of every civilized
nation. Confusion results, however, from the fact that, with the main
purpose of protecting their commerce, nearly all of the maritime
nations have enacted severe laws against piratical depredations,6 and
"1See Harvard Draft, Article 3, paragraph 1; 26 Am. Jour. Int. Law (Supp.),
743. Article 4, paragraph 1, ibid., 822; Article 3, Roumanian Draft, ibid., 874.
1
2 See League of Nations Document, C. 196, M. 70, 1927, V., 119; also 26
Am. Jour. Int. Law (Supp.), 733-785.
'3 Supra note 11.
'4The italics are supplied.
'5See Rex. v. Dawson, supra note 3; Kent, op. cit., 183-189; 6 Holdsworth,
op. cit., 400; 2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law, 27; Story, op. cit., 52-58.
16Supra note 10; and see Whatley, loc. cit., 618. Japan, Russia, and Tur-
key are probably the only larger countries not having laws in force on piracy.
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although the basis of these laws appears to be the principle that
piracy is contrary to the law as it has developed among nations, the
various laws lack uniformity as well as completeness. Questions
arise as to whether there are two distinct kinds of piracy; that is,
piracy which is an offense against international law and piracy which
is a violation of the municipal law of a state, and also as to the place
which piracy occupies in each system of law.17
To answer the first of these questions: piracy is not and cannot
be, under present circumstances, a crime against the law of nations,
but is always an offense against municipal law, inasmuch as it con-
cerns the acts of individuals and not of states.28 International law
is a rule of conduct for international persons or entities, who alone
may violate its provisions. 9 Even though the state should assume
the responsibility for the acts of an individual, it is generally agreed
that he would not be responsible to any other law than the one hav-
ing jurisdiction over his person, that is, the municipal law of the
state.20  It follows that one cannot properly be convicted of piracy
solely upon proof that his action is contrary to the law of nations.
A conviction may be obtained only by reference to municipal law.
What, then, is the place of piracy in international law? First
of all, international law permits dny nation to assume jurisdiction
over offenses that are generally considered of a piratical nature.21
Pirate ships lose all nationality and can be brought before the courts
of any country. A lack of uniformity as to what is piracy may cause
disputes among the nations. Thus, when the United States recog-
nized the slave trade as lawful and Great Britain did not, the British
were ready to treat slave ships on the high seas as pirates. This
'17Cf. the earlier writers on the law of nations, cited above, e. g., Story,
Kent, and others, with Brierly, J. L., The Law of Nationr (1928), 154. See
the Harvard Draft, 26 Am. Jour. Int. Law (Supp.), 771-778.
%sThere seems to have been an over-emphasis on international law by such
early writers as Story and Kent. See Williams, J. F., "International Criminal
Law," Chapters on Current International Law and the League of Nations (1929),
248. Cf. Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes (3rd ed., 1927), 661-662; Kenny,
op. cit., 430; 6 Holdsworth, op. cit., 401.
'19 Eagleton takes the view that the individual may violate international law
"piracy." See his Responsibility of States in International Law (1928), 40-41.
Cf. Williams, op. cit., 247-248: "International law thus operates, in relation
to piracy, to extend the province of municipal law beyond the limits otherwise
set to it, and in the course of this operation international law necessarily gives
or accepts a definition of the crime."
20See Whatley, loc. cit., 553-554.
21"One unique exception is, indeed, universally allowed. For persons
guilty of any act of 'Piracy lure gentium' are treated as the common enemy
of all mankind, and any nation that can arrest them may exercise jurisdiction
over them, whatsoever their nationality, and wheresoever their crime may have
been committed, even within the territorial waters of some other nation."
Kenny, op. cit., 430. Cf. Stephen, Digest, Ch. X, Art. 108.
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shows the desirability of some agreement as to what constitutes piracy
from the point of view of international law even though piracy is not
a crime against that law. In other words no conviction of the in-
dividual can be secured by virtue of international law alone, but in-
stead, the international law of piracy is concerned with permitting a
state to exercise jurisdiction beyond its territorial boundaries so that
the state may punish individuals committing offenses involving rob-
bery or certain depredations upon the high seas.
International law, as it is concerned with piracy, has changed
only slightly or not at all since the development of customary rules
on the subject. It is true that many often interpret piracy under
international law purely in the sense of prevailing rules of national
law ;22 but this may lead to inaccuracies nd confusion. Not only
are there wide differences of definition of the term in the varying
national laws, 23 but there are some few states which have failed to
enact laws against piracy.24 It may be argued with some force, there-
fore, that since all nations do not recognize the offense, piracy ap-
pears in the law of nations only to the extent that custom has made
it a part of that law.
In contrast to piracy under international law, piracy under mu-
nicipal law has been characterized by periodic additions according to
the legislative whims of the respective nations, or by treaties between
nations. 25 Early criminal laws levied severe punishment upon those
found guilty of piratical acts.28 Offenders received no mercy before
municipal courts, but were given the extreme penalty of capital pun-
ishment no matter how trivial the offense. The rigor of the law was
somewhat lessened, however, by the fact that it was found difficult
to prove guilt. This was no doubt because of the expeditious way
in which the pirate treated his victims. For a long while, and until
comparatively recent times, a class of pirates unknown to this age
profitably plied its profession upon the seas by preying indiscrim-
inately upon the commerce of nations. 7 Although this older type
22See Whatley, loc. cit., 550.
2SCf. Mercantile Marine Code for Tripolitania and Cyrenaica of June 22,
1913, 26 Am. Jour. Int. Law (Supp.), 982-984, with the United States Criminal
Code of March 4, 1919, 35 Stat. 1088.
24Supra note 16.
25Cf. Dickinson, loc. cit., 347-350.
28See 6 Holdsworth, op. cit., 400.
27See the charge to the grand jury, delivered in the circuit court of the
United States, for the judicial district of Maine, 1st session, in Portland,
May 8, 1820, Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story (ed. by W. W. Story,
Boston, 1852), 130-136. Cf. the following statement by Malcolm, J., in People
v. Lol-Lo and Saraw, 43 P. I. 19, 21 (1922): "The days when pirates roamed
the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd
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of pirate disappeared with the development of large national navies,
it was he who brought into existence the national laws against
piracy and aided in the development of a rule of customary law
condemning the practice. It is he who is the obsolete factor in
piracy, and not the law of states or the rules developed among nations
to suppress his activities.
Yet there appears to be some inconsistency among jurists and
other authorities as to what exactly constitutes the crime even under
municipal law.28 All agree that robbery upon the high seas is one
factor in piracy. But courts have sometimes found much difficulty in
construing statutes in which the term "high seas" is found.
2 9  It
has also been questioned whether seizures made without governmental
authority upon rivers were properly termed piracy. 0 Doubtless the
positivist would consider them acts committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of a sovereign state and therefore differing only slightly
from robbery committed upon land, yet some jurists and writers
consider them piracy. In their opinion ships descending upon a coast
town for the purpose of robbing and murdering the inhabitants are
pirate ships."- The Supreme Court of the United States has never
had occasion to decide this question.
In municipal courts privateering is sometimes confused with
piracy in international law.32 Although privateering is probably ob-
solete, there can be no doubt that it may constitute piracy at munici-
pal law if the statute so defines the term. There are a number of
national cases in which privateering was held to be piracy, especially
in those cases when the vessel sailed under a commission issued by
and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grotesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance.
Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy
in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity,
so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder."
2SSee 2 Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 27-28; Kenny, op. cit., 331; 6
Holdsworth, op. cit., 401.
29See United States v. Rodgers, 150 U. S. 249 (1893).
80"Piracy is a maritime offence, and cannot be committed on a river, how-
ever large, far within the boundaries of a State." 1 Russell, op. cit., 260. See
Republic of Bolivia v. Oriental Indemnity Ins. Co., (1909), 1 K. B. 785; Rex
v. Dawson, supra note 3, approved in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Kwok-
a-Sing (1909) L. R. 5 P. C. "The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes
has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all.
Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile
limit of a foreign state, for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral
to crimes." Lol-Lo Case, 43 P. I. 19, 22-23 (1922).
3'See 1 Oppenheim, International Law (1905), 329; Hall, International Law
(7th ed.), sec. 81; Lawrence, International Law (4th ed.), sec. 122; Westlake,
International Law (1904 ed.), Pt. I, 277; 1 Hyde, International Law (1922), 411.
a2See Dana note 84, Wheaton, International Law (8th ed.), 196; and 3
Wharton, op. cit., .2534.
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an unrecognized insurgent government; but this phase of the subject
will not be treated in detail in this article. Privateering was never
considered in the past to be piracy according to the law of nations3s
By way of summary it may be stated that piracy has for a long
time been treated as a subject of primary importance. It is a matter
which writers on international law as well as municipal law have al-
ways stressed. Jurists and publicists seem to have regarded it as
having a definite place in the development of common and widely
accepted principles of law. The Supreme Court of the United States
and other national courts have laid down rules of law on piracy that'
at least express evidence of what is customary international law and
they have established precedents to be followed in future cases aris-
ing in their own national courts.
In the light of the preceding discussion it is interesting to ex-
amine the decisions of the Supreme Court. Although the last case
directly involving piracy was decided by the Supreme Court nearly a
century ago,3' this is not necessarily an indication that future cases
may not arise.35 Laws upon piracy in the United States have been
changed so often that piracy at present includes a number of crimes.3
Recently there was a case before the Supreme Court of the Philip-
pine Islands involving certain felonious acts which were held to be
piratical under the existing statutes of the Islands.
37
The Supreme Court has, in a number of cases, treated piracy as
a subject regulated and controlled by certain generally accepted rules
of law."8 In the Constitution Congress is given the power to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas in the
same sentence in which it is given the power to define offenses against
the law of nations.8  The Supreme Court, of course, has appellate
jurisdiction over all cases arising under the acts of Congress. After
an examination of the decisions of the Court upon these cases of
piracy it is one of the purposes of this article to find what rules of
law have been laid down and to what extent they conform to those
generally considered to be rules of international law. Another pur-
88Cf. Baker v. United States, 5 Blatchf. 6, 12. See Nelson, J., in the case
of the Oflcers of the Savannah, 371--cited in 2 Moore, Digest, sec. 330.
"Peter Harmony and Others, Claimants, the Brig Malek Adhel, v. United
States, 2 How. 210, 238 (1844).
35Dickinson, loc. cit., 360
BeCriminal Code, March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1088.
8 People v. Lol-Lo and Saraw, 43 P. I. 19.
"8See the "Annual Address of the President of the American Society of
International Law," 27th meeting, -April 27, 1933, Proceedings, 15-16.
"9Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10, "To define and punish piracies and felonies com-
mitted on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations."
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pose is to find to what extent the Court has added to or aided in
the development of customarily accepted rules of law among nations.
Probably the leading case involving piracy is that of the United
States v. Smith.40 Smith and others had been part of the crew of the
private armed vessel, the Creollo, commissioned by the government
of Buenos Ayres, a colony which at the time was at war with Spain.
When the vessel was lying at the port of Margaritta, Smith and cer-
tain others, all members of the vessel's crew, mutinied, confined their
officer, and finally abandoned the vessel. The mutinous crew then
seized the Irresistible, a private armed vessel lying in that port, and
commissioned by the government of Artigas, which was also at war
with Spain. Smith and his fellow conspirators appointed officers
and proceeded to sea without a commission from any government.
In April, 1819, while cruising the high seas, the crew of the Irresistible
committed the offense charged in the indictment; that is, they
plundered and robbed a Spanish vessel.
This case was first tried in the circuit court of Virginia and
brought up on appeal to the Supreme Court. The chief point to be
decided was whether or not the facts warranted a conviction for
piracy under the terms of the act of Congress of March 3, 1819.41
Among other things the statute provided "that if any person or per-
sons whatsoever, shall, upon the high seas, commit the crime of piracy,
as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or offenders
shall be brought into, or found in the United States, every such of-
fender or offenders shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished with
death." 42 It was the principal task of the Court to determine whether
the act of Congress sufficiently defined the term piracy so that the
courts would have the power to convict the alleged offenders. If
a strict interpretation of the statute were rendered, then the statute
would not of necessity be regarded as covering the facts presented
to the Court.-s A broad construction of the statute would mean
going beyond the exact wording and employing the term "law of
nations" in a wider sense. In the case of the latter construction the
Court would be able to convict Smith upon the charge of piracy.
Counsel for both sides presented able argument." It was the
405 Wheat. 153, 183 (1820).
4lQuestions as to the scope of sec. 8 of the Act of 1790 led to the enact-
ment of a new provision in the Act of March 3, 1819, 3 Stat. 510. See 1 Warren,
The Supreme Court in United States History, 579.42See 5 Wheat. 153, 157. The italics supplied.
4"If there was a conviction then the Court had to go beyond the wording
of the Statute; that is, bring in the law of nations.
"Daniel Webster served as counsel for the defendant and William Wirt
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contention of the Attorney-General that Congress, by referring to
the law of nations for a definition of the crime of piracy, had duly
exercised the power given them by the Constitution "to define and
punish piracies . . committed on the high seas .... " and
that, by this reference, they had adopted the definition of the offense
given by the writers on public law.
Daniel Webster appeared as counsel in behalf of the defendants.
He asserted that Congress was bound to define piracy, in terms, and
was not at liberty to leave it to be ascertained by judicial interpreta-
tion. He claimed that a reference to the law of nations for a defini-
tion of piracy was insufficient "for the very thing to be ascertained
by the definition, is the law of nations on the subject."' 0 Webster's
view also was that writers on public law do not define piracy with
any "precision and certainty." He argued that Congress must define
the term just as the Constitution had defined treason, "not by re-
ferring to the law of nations, in one case, or to common law, in the
other, but by giving a distinct, intelligible, explanation of the nature
of the offense in the act itself." That this argument was a clear
and logical statement of a proper interpretation of the case may be
readily seen from an examination of studies on the history and de-
velopment of piracy.47 Webster's view was that of a positivist. He
looked upon piracy as a crime at municipal law and regarded the
courts as restricted to the letter of the statute.
The Court regarded Webster's contention as narrow and referred
with approval to the statement in The Federalist that congressional
action was unnecessary to make the constitutional provision effective,
for an adequate definition of piracy could be found by looking to the
law of nations.4 8 It thought that the law of nations on the subject
might be ascertained "by consulting the works of jurists, writing
professedly on public laws; or by the general usage and practice of
appeared for the government, 5 Wheat. 153, 155-157. See 1 Warren, op. cit.,
584.
,5The Attorney-General cited "Grotius, de. J. B. ac. P., 1.2, c. 15, s. 5, Puf-
fendorf, 1.2, c. 2, s. 10. Vattel, Droit des Gens, 1.3, c. 15, s. 226. Bynk. Q. J.
Pub. 1, 1 Duponceau's Trans., p. 127. Marten's Hist. of Privateers, p. 2.
Plorne's Trans. Molloy, b. 1, c. 4, s. 5. 2 Bro. Civ. and Adm. Law, 461.
2 Azuni, 351, Johns. Trans., and the authorities there cited." Note in 5 Wheat.
155. The Attorney-General claimed that "The definition given by them (the
authorities) is certain, consistent, and unanimous; and pirates being hostes
humani generis, are punishable in the tribunals of all nations." 5 Wheat. 156.
4See Webster's argument, 5 Wheat. 156-157.
47Cf. Harvard Draft, "Introduction," 26 Am. four. Int. Law (Supp.), 749-
766. See Marshall's opinion in United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610 (1818);
see, also, 1 Warren, op. cit., 578-580.
48United States v. Smith. 5 Wheat. 153, 159, referring to The Federalist,
No. 42 (Madison). See The Federalist (ed., John C. Hamilton, 1864), 331.
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nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."49
Justice Story, who delivered the opinion of the Court, found that
there was "scarcely a writer on the law of nations who does not allude
to piracy as a crime of a settled and determinate nature; and what-
ever may be the diversity of definitions, in other respects, all writ-
ers concur, in holding, that robbery, or forcible depredations upon
the sea, animo furandi, is piracy."' 0 He cited various authorities
upon maritime law as having the same opinion and he pointed out
that the common law also recognizes anl punishes piracy as an
offense, not against its own municipal code, but as an offense against
the law of nations. The majority of the Court thus came to the con-
clusion that piracy depended both for its definitions and its punish-
ment "not upon the particular provision of any municipal code, but
upon the law of nations" and that a true definition by that law was
robbery upon the sea.51 Thus, the Court considered the term to be
"sufficiently and constitutionally defined" by the statute in question.5 2
In order to justify his conclusions in this case Justice Story drew
largely upon what he assumed was actual international law. His
was a broad interpretationx and really expressed his opinion as to
what the customary international law on piracy was, at that time.53
But although it is true that the decision has its weak points, that it
is probably based upon an erroneous conception of international law
which is at present discredited, it serves, nevertheless, an important
purpose in showing the extent to which the Court at an early period
in its history looked beyond the municipal law to what it thought was
a law equally as binding.8'
The Court did not make any distinction between piracy at munic-
ipal law aind piracy under the law of nations and this is the real weak-
495 Wheat. 153, 160-161; Dr. James Brown Scott, and others, e. g., Dickin-
son and Kent, commend Story's view in this case.5OStory cites, in a long note, a number of writers and cases on piracy.
United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 163.
UlSee comment of 2 Stephen, Hist. of Crim. Law, 28-29; and 4 Blackstone,
Commentaries, 731, cited by Story in note, 5 Wheat. 163.
52The Court cited numerous authorities and cases to prove the conclusive-
ness of its holding, referring particularly to a large number of the older and
accepted authorities upon international law. Sir William Scott's opinion in
The Maria (see note, 5 Wheat. 170), was cited with approval, as well as the
cases of Rex v. Dawson (supra note 3), the trial of William Kidd (13 Wil-
liam III, 1701; 14 State Trials, 1816, 123, 147), Rex v. Green (4 Anne, 1705,
14 State Trials, 1199), and certain other well known English decisions. See
Story, op. cit., 52-58; Kent, op. cit., 183-187; and Dickinson, loc. cit., 350.
53His claim that piracy was an offense contrary to the law of nations, un-
doubtedly merits criticism. See Harvard Draft, 26 An. Jour. Int. Law (Supp.),
733-785.
"See Scott, J. B., Am. Soc. Int. Law, Proceedings (1933), 19.
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ness in the opinion and the principal reason why it may be discounted
at the present time. To the Court, piracy had only one definition, and
was a crime contrary only to international law. In holding this view
the Court undoubtedly erred.55  An individual can not, under any
logical system of reasoning, violate international law in the proper
sense of the term. International law may grant to any and every
nation the right to take jurisdiction over crimes committed upon the
high seas, but only to that extent can international law envisage the
crime of piracy.
If this case makes any contribution it is to be found in the liberal
view which the Court takes toward international law even though its
opinion is not a correct exposition of the general rule of law. Per-
haps the more correct view appears in the dissenting opinion of Jus-
tice Livingston which was in fact an able presentation of a positivistic
argument. He thought that there was considerable uncertainty among
writers upon public law as to what was understood by the term pir-
acy.56 He considered that the Constitution authorized Congress to
define the term and unless that body did define it, there could hardly
be a basis for prosecution before the courts of this country. In
answer to the majority opinion that certainty existed among writers
of public law in regard to piracy he pointed out that "If in criminal
cases everything is sufficiently certain, which by reference may be
rendered so, which was an argument used at bar, it is not perceived
why a reference to the laws of China, or to any other foreign code,
would not have answered the purpose quite as well as the one which
has been resorted to" in this case. 7 He pointed out that by the same
clause of the Constitution which gives Congress power to define and
punish piracy it is also given the power to punish offenses against
the law of nations. If the interpretation of the majority of the Court
were accepted as a rule, Congress could declare that offenses against
th6 law of nations should be punished with death, without defining
any one of them. Yet, as he justly remarks, this would hardly be a
fair or a legitimate exercise of authority.
This dissenting opinion can not be overlooked. The fact is that it
would now more than likely be given weight as an authoritative state-
ment of the present law upon the subject. Piracy in United States v.
Smith was a subject to be dealt with by a municipal court meting out
5SSee Stephen, supra note 51; and cf. Dickinson, loc. cit., 346, who supports
the conclusion of Justice Story in this case.
565 Wheat. 153, 181. See Stephen, supra note 51, and cf. Kenny, op. cit.,
331-332, and others writing on criminal law.
575 Wheat. 181.
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justice in conformity with the law enacted by Congress. It was ap-
parently not Justice Livingston's view that piracy according to inter-
national law was the basis of a nation's jurisdiction. It was his
opinion, and it seems quite correct, that this was a case in which the
act of Congress was to determine or to define what the courts were to
administer in the matter of piracy. It was an able dissenting opinion
and it undoubtedly may be regarded as a more direct exposition of
what piracy is, according to municipal law, than the decision of the
majority of the Court.
United States v. Smith is still regarded as the leading Supreme
Court decision upon the subject of piracy. As has been pointed
out, however, it is extremely doubtful whether the Court will take
the same view in future cases, for today most authorities agree with
the dissenting opinion of Justice Livingston. 9
When are seizures made upon the high seas piratical? If cap-
tures are made by ships commissioned by a revolutionary government,
are such seizures legitimate?0 In answering these questions the
Court has been guided almost entirely by the attitude expressed by
the political departments of the government as to the exact status of
the insurrection.6 In the case of Ralph Klintock, a citizen of the
United States was placed in command of a vessel commissioned by one
Aury, calling himself Brigadier of the Mexican Republic, a republic
whose existence was not acknowledged by the United States.62 Klin-
rock sailed as a first lieutenant on a ship called the Young Spartan,
commissioned by the above Aury. He encountered and boarded a
Danish ship, the Norberg, upon which the officer immediately under
Klintock concealed some Spanish papers in a locker on board, which
he later affected to have found there. The Norberg "was then taken
possession of, the whole original ship's company left on an island on
the coast of Cuba," and the second officer of the Young Spartan
being put in command, he took the name of the original captain of
the Danish vessel. He sailed for Savannah where, upon arrival, he
impersonated the Danish captain. The Young Spartan followed the
Norberg into Savannah. Counsel for Klintock contended that Aury's
commission exempted the prisoner from the charge of piracy and
58See Dickinson, loc. cit., 346; and Scott's "Presidential Address," supra.
note 38.
59This decision, as pointed out by Dickinson, loc. cit., 350, fails to distin-
guish between international law piracy and municipal law piracy. Cf. Kenny,
op. cit., 430.60See Dana, note 84, Wheaton, International Law (8th ed.), 197.
dlSee Nelson, J., in United States v. Baker, 5 Blatchf. 6, 12 (1861).
62United States v. Klintock, 5 Wheat. 144 (1820), Marshall, C. J.
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that although fraud was practiced upon the Danish ship, it was not
in any sense piracy.63 The circuit court found the defendant guilty
of the charge, from which holding he appealed.
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Supreme
Court. He thought that the entire transaction demonstrated the fact
that the Norberg was not captured jure belli, but was a seizure illegally
made, and that the vessel was taken into Savannah animo furandi.
6
4
He held that it was a plain case of robbery upon the high seas, and
although the fraud practiced on the Danish captain and crew might
not in itself have constituted piracy, yet it was an ingredient in the
transaction, which had no tendency to mitigate the character of the
offense. Here, too, it was the task of the Court to construe an act
of Congress. 5 In so doing, the Court looked to international law for
evidence as to the intention of the framers of the act of Congress.
Thus the Court ruled that the municipal law extended to all persons
on board vessels which had thrown off their national character and
which were cruising piratically and committing the offenses brought
out in the facts of this case." The justice and legal weight of the
opinion in the Klintock case can hardly be criticized, for it is a clear
construction of the act of Congress.""
685 Wheat. 144, 148-149.
e4Ibid., 150; see, also, Dana, notes 83-84, Wheaton, op. cit., 196-199; and
I Hyde, International Law, 415.
665 Wheat. 144, 145-146. The 8th section of the act of 1790 provided,
"That if any person or persons shall commit, upon the high seas, or in any
river, haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, mur-
der or robbery, or any other offense, which, if committed within the body
of a country, would by the laws of the United States, be punishable with
death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically
and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise
to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any
pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby
to hinder and prevent his fighting in defense of his ship, or goods committed
to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be
deemed, taken, and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof con-
victed, shall suffer death: and the trial of crimes committed on the high seas,
or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, shall be in the
district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may be first
brought."
66Dickinson, loc. cit., 346-347, claims this case is followed by the later case
of United States v. Bowers and Mathews, see infra note 75.
67"The Court is of opinion that the crime of robbery, committed by a
person on the high seas, on board of any ship or vessel belonging exclusively
to subjects of a foreign state, or persons within a vessel belonging exclusively to
the subjects of a foreign state, is not a piracy within the true intent and mean-
ing of the Act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States."
Opinion of Marshall, C. J., 3 Wheat. 610, 633-634.
"There are several inconsistencies growing out of a construction unfavor-
able to the prisoners, which merit the most serious consideration. The first is,
the most sanguinary character that it gives to this law in its operation; for it
is literally true, that under it a whole ship's crew may be consigned to the
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In the case of United States v. Holmes" a vessel that was ap-
parently Spanish was captured by two privateers out of Buenos
Ayres, and a prize crew was placed on board. The defendants
brought before the Court were members of that prize crew; one of
them was a citizen of the United States and the others were foreign-
ers. They were charged with the murder of the prize master of the
captured vessel. There was no evidence to show who were the own-
ers of the privateers or where they resided, neither was there anything
of an informative nature in regard to the ships' papers or documents.
The privateers had been at Buenos Ayres, and had openly kept a
rendezvous there. The crews which they shipped from that port con-
sisted chiefly of men of English, French, and American nationality.
The commander of one of the privateers was a citizen of the United
States whose family was domiciled in the city of Baltimore and both
of the privateering vessels were built in Baltimore.
Justice Washington, speaking for the majority of the Court, rea-
soned that murder or robbery committed on the high seas may be
an offefse cognizable by the courts of the United States under certain
circumstances, although it may have been committed on bdard a
vessel not belonging to citizens of the United States and without a
national character, possessed and held by pirates, or by persons not
lawfully sailing under the flag of any foreign country. The Court
ruled here that if an act of murder be committed either by a citizen
or a foreigner, on board of a piratical vessel, "the offense is equally
cognizable by the courts of the United States" under the statute con-
cerning piracy.6e
In this case Justice Washington seldom employed the terms in-
ternational law or law of nations, but decided the case entirely in
accordance with what he regarded as the wording of the act of Con-
gress. Yet he did reconcile his opinion with the facts and holding of
the Court in United States v. Klintock.70 His decision was probably
also in conformity with international law in so far as it deals with
piracy, for privateering was not considered a lawful undertaking




gallows, for robbing a vessel of a single chicken, even although a robbery com-
mitted on land for thousands, may not have been made punishable beyond true
whipping or confinement. If natural reason is not to be consulted on this point,
at least the mild and benignant spirit of the laws of the United States merit
attention." Johnson, J., 3 Wheat. 610, 638-639. See I Warren, Supreme Court
in United States History, 578.
685 Wheat. 412 (1820).
egCf. the facts in this case with United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610.
7OSee Wharton, op. cit., 2534; and Nelson, J., supra note 61.
n5 Wheat. 412, 416-418.
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In 1820, the same year as the decision in United States v. Holmes,
a series of cases pertinent to the present discussion came before the
Court and all were decided under the title of United States v. Pirates.72
Although the facts in each case were different, all were alleged to set
forth piratical acts on the part of the defendants. The first of these
cases dealt with one John Furlong, alias Hobson, and concerned the
conduct of an English subject, who at the time was a member of
the crew, on board an English vessel.78
Another set of facts concerned an American citizen who had fitted
out a vessel in an American port for the purpose of cruising against
a power at peace with the United States. The vessel had a commis-
sion from a belligerent government and the principal question was
whether the act of Congress covered the points at issue.7'
According to the third set of facts David Bowers and Henry
Mathews were indicted under the act of Congress dealing with piracy
on the charge of committing a piratical robbery on an American ship.
While members of the crew of the privateer Louisa they mutinied,
removed the officers from the ship and proceeded upon an alleged
piratical cruise. The Louisa had been commissioned by the Republic
of Buenos Ayres, and commanded by Captain Olmeida. The accused
were Americar; citizens, and the acts for which they were indicted
were perpetrated upon the ship Asia, an American ship, which at the
time of the robbery was anchored in av open roadstead at the island
of Bonavista.
7 5
Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court upon all these
statements of fact. The questions at issue called for an interpreta-
tion of the statutes on piracy. The Court held that the moment a
ship was taken from her officers, with the intent of proceeding on a
piratical cruise, then the crew lost all claim to the national character
of the vessel, the citizens or foreigners on board such vessel became




In a learned exposition of the subject of piracy Justice Johnson
asserted that robbery on the seas may be considered an offense
725 Wheat. 184 (1820).
73Ibid., 203-204.
74This, of course, is the principal question in all cases coming before the
Court. Cf. United States v. Holmes, supra note 68; United States v. Benjamin
Brailford and James Griith, 5 Wheat 188-189, holding of the Court, 203-205.
7
5United States v. David Bowers and Henry Mathews, 5 Wheat. 184, 189-192;
see the holding of the Court, ibid., 205-206.
TaSee infra note 82.
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within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations.77 He considered piracy
as committed against all, and punishable by all, and in his opinion,
there could be no doubt that the plea of autre fois acquit would be
good, in any civilized state, although resting on a prosecution insti-
tuted in some other civilized state.
In these cases there is little or no development of the view ex-
pressed in United States v. Smith that piracy is an offense defined
by the law of nations. The facts were ruled upon entirely in the
light of the act of Congress on piracy. Generally speaking, in these
several cases the Court made little reference to international law as
authority.
In United States v. Palmer,78 one John Palmer, with others,
boarded a Spanish ship at sea and took certain valuable merchandise
from her. The case was first brought before the circuit court for the
Massachusetts district which proposed a series of some eleven ques-
tions which had to be answered before a decision could be made upon
the facts in the case. The lower court being divided in opinion the
case was certified to the Supreme Court which thereupon proceeded
to answer these questions. The first four related to the construction
of the 8th section of the act of Congress "for the punishment of cer-
tain crimes against the United States." The argument had been made
that since robbery committed on land was not punishable with death,
by the laws of the United States, it was not a proper interpretation
of the act of Congress to consider robbery on the high seas as piracy.
In other words, it was contended that Congress did not intend to
make that a capital offense on the high seas which was not a capital
offense on land. In rendering the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice
Marshall stated that he could not assent to the correctness of the
above argument although it was entitled "to great respect on every
account." "The legislature having specified murder and robbery par-
ticularly, are understood to indicate clearly the intention that those
offenses shall be piracy."
A second question was whether Congress had intended to apply
the words of the statute to the subjects of a foreign power, who in a
foreign ship may commit murder or robbery on the high seas. The
Court answered this question in the negative asserting that "it would
seem that offenses against the United States, not offenses against the
human race, were the crimes which the legislature intended by this
7TThe opinion, 5 Wheat. 197, referred with approval to United States v.
Smith.
783 Wheat. 610.
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law to punish."78 1 Therefore, according to the Court, robbery com-
mitted by a person on the high seas, on board of any ship or vessel
belonging to subjects of a foreign state, and committed on persons
within such vessel, was not piracy within the true intent and meaning
of the act of Congress and was not punishable in the courts of the
United States. 0 In this holding Chief Justice Marshall conformed to
the general rule of statutory interpretation.8 1
Justice Johnson, in a separate opinion, found it impossible to
agree with Chief Justice Marshall. He thought it was inconsistent
to distinguish between robbery on land and robbery at sea for the
purpose of considering the latter a more serious offense. He rea-
soned that it was not the intention of the framers of the statute upon
piracy to inflict the death penaly "for robbing a vessel of a single
chicken, even although a robbery committed on land for thousands,
may not have been made punishable beyond whipping or confine-
ment.."8 2 Consequently Marshall, in his analysis of the case, may be
considered to have adopted a strict construction of the statute. The
proper interpretation of the municipal law on piracy was his sole
concern in deciding this case, and he thought it unnecessary to make
references to any other law. It is interesting to compare this case
with United States v. Smith wherein Justice Story drew largely upon
international law for a definition of the crime of piracy.8 s
In the case of the Brig Malek Adhel v. United States,8 ' decided
by Justice Story, frequent references were made to the law of nations.
According to the facts the ship in question sailed from New York
bound to Guayman, in California, under the command of one, Joseph
Nunez. Armed with a cannon and some ammunition, pistols, and
daggers, it stopped several vessels upon the high seas, and at length
put into the port of Fayal, where it remained for some days. In
August, 1840, it arrived at Bahia, Brazil, where it was seized by the
United States vessel of war, the Enterprise. A libel was there filed
against the vessel and cargo upon several counts, all founded upon
the act of Congress passed in order to protect the commerce of the
United States, and to punish the crime of piracy.8 5 Other counts
793 Wheat. 631.
8OSee the opinion of Johnson, J., United States v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. 184,
197.
11 Kent, op. cit., 186, 187, supports this decision as well as does Johnson,
J., in United States v. Pirates, supra note 80.
823 Wheat. 610, 639.
83Supra note 48.
842 How. 210, 238 (1844).
85The statute referred to, at 2 How. 229, was the Act of March 3, 1819,
Ch. 75.
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were afterwards added, charging that the acts complained of had been
done in violation of the law of nations. The district court condemned
the vessel, but restored the cargo to the claimants and owners and
apportioned part of the cost among these claimants. Both parties
appealed."
Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the Court, commented
upon the use of the term "piratical" in the act of Congress. He said
that the word, in a general sense, imported that the aggression was
unauthorized by the law of nations, and utterly without any sanction
from any public authority or sovereign power.8 7 Law, he reasoned,
looks upon a piratical action as one of hostility; if a vessel is not
commissioned and is not engaged in lawful warfare, its action is re-
garded as that of a pirate, that is, as the act of one who is emphati-
cally hostis humrani generis. It was Story's contention that the act of
Congress upon piracy had done nothing more than to affirm and en-
force the general principles recognized in the law of nations.8
Story's opinion in this case is open to criticism and perhaps
evades the real issue. He uses the term "law of nations" very
broadly, and seems to take a biased view of the facts that were pre-
sented to the Court. To him piracy was piracy without any distinc-
tion between the term as it was recognized by the act of Congress
and as it is employed in international law.
In 1821, the United States ship of war, the Alligator, encountered
the Portuguese ship, the Marianna Flora.89 According to the facts in
the case they were "mutually described" by each other off the coast of
Africa. The American ship had been sent to cruise against pirates
and slave-traders, under instructions of the President; the Portuguese
vessel was bound- on a voyage from Bahia to Lisbon, with a valuable
cargo on board. Soon after the meeting the Marianna Flora short-
ened her sail and hove to, having at this time a vane or flag on her
mDickinson, loc. cit., 355.
872 How. 210, 232.
88The Court gave great weight to the view that the action of the master
and crew would not justify any adverse action against the cargo unless, of
course, the owner thereof cooperated in or authorized the unlawful acts. See
argument of Meredith for claimants, 2 How. 224; Nelson, Attorney-General,
upon right of owners to cargo, ibid., 226; R. Johnson, for the United States,
on "What Is the Law of Nations as to the Cargo," ibid., 228. Story's opinion,
ibid., 237-238.
Dickinson, loc. cit., 350, sums up the American position on piracy in the
following words: "So it is that the modem law of piracy in America has been
derived principally from the law of nations, by virtue of federal statute, and
that the crime of piracy by that law has been commonly defined as robbery upon
the seas."
8911 'Wheat. 1. 58 (1826).
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mast, somewhat below the head, which together with her other
manoeuvers, induced Lieutenant Stockton of the Alligator to suppose
that she was in distress, or wished information. When the Alligator
approached the Portuguese vessel, the latter fired upon him, where-
upon Lieutenant Stockton hoisted the United States flag and pendant.
He captured the Marianna Flora which raised her national flag just
before surrendering. The prize was sent to Boston as a captured
pirate ship.9'
Justice Story delivered the opinion of the Court in this case.
Among other things, he declared that pirates may, without doubt, be
lawfully captured on the ocean by the public or private ships of
every nation; for they are, in truth, the common enemies of all man-
kind, and, as such, are liable to the extreme penalties of war. Ac-
cording to the Court a piratical aggression by an armed vessel, sail-
ing under the regular flag of any nation, may be subjected to the
penalty of confiscation for such a gross breach of the law of nations.Y'
"But every hostile attack, in a time of peace, is not necessarily
piratical. It may be by mistake, or in necessary self-defense, or to
repel a supposed meditated attack by pirates.11
92
A number of cases in which the charge of piracy was made arose
out of the Civil War.93 A large number of authorities contended that
captures made by privateers commissioned by the Confederate gov-
ernment were piratical and that the capture of such privateers ought
to result in a trial for piracy."' In the earlier cases before the fed-
eral district courts involving these privateers the defendants were
dealt with as pirates,95 but in the case of Ford v. Surget9 9 the Su-
preme Court decided that they should not be treated as such, for the
Federal blockade in itself was a tacit recognition of the South as a
belligerent power. Justice Clifford, in a concurring opinion, at-
tempted to show in a clear and analytical way that the captures by
Confederate privateers and naval vessels could not on any sound in-
terpretation be treated as piracy.
97
In the case of the Palmyra: Escurra, Master, an American vessel
captured upon the high seas a Spanish privateer which had searched
9OIbid., 4-6.
9111 Wheat. 1, 38-39.
112Ibid., 41.
93See supra note 60; Baker v. United States, supra note 33; 2 Moore,
Digest, sec. 330.94See citations in 3 Wharton, op. cit., 2529.95See 2 Moore, Digest, 1079-1083, sec. 330.
9697 U. S. 596, 619 (1878).
97Ibid., 618.
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two American merchant vessels. The privateer was taken into an
American port upon the charge of piracy. Justice Story, passing upon
the facts in the case, upheld the judgment of the lower court restoring
the vessel to the Spanish owners, but thought that no damage should
be awarded because, under the circumstances, the captors should not be
penalized for attributing a piratical character to the Spanish ship.98
In justifying the action of the American vessel the Court rea-
soned that although the privateer might have been protected by a
bona fide commission, yet in the present case it was otherwise, and the
defects in the irregular commission of the Spanish vessel, connected
with the insubordination and predatory spirit of the crew, were suffi-
cient to excite a justly founded suspicion.
In 1819, a privateer, the Columbia, sailing under a Venezuelan
commission, entered the port of Baltimore, clandestinely took on a
crew of thirty or forty men, and proceeded to sea.9  It thereupon
hoisted the Artegan flag, assumed the name Arragonta, and prosecuted
a voyage along the African coast. The officers and a greater part of
the crew were citizens of the United States. While just off the
African coast it captured an American vessel from which it took some
twenty-five Africans. It later captured several Portuguese vessels,
from which it took Africans; and, still later, it captured a Spanish
vessel, the Antelope, upon which there was a large number of negroes.
The Antelope and the privateer thereupon sailed to Brazil where the
latter was wrecked and her master and a great part of her crew made
prisoners; the remainder of the crew, with the armament of the
Arraganta, was transferred to the Antelope, which, thus armed, as-
sumed the name General Ramirez, under the command of one, John
Smith, a citizen of the United States. The negroes were all placed
upon this vessel. The United States revenue cutter, Dallas, found
the Antelope hovering near the coast of the United States and cap-
tured her with two hundred eighty negroes on board. The Spanish
and Portuguese vice-consuls claimed these negroes as property of
their citizens. They were also claimed by the United States on the
grounds that they had been transported from foreign parts by Amer-
ican citizens in contravention of the laws of the United States; and
were entitled to their 'freedom by those laws as well as by the law
of nations.
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court in
this case. He cited with approval the decision of Sir William Scott
9812 Wheat. 1, 18 (1827).
92The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66 (1825). See the argument of the Attorney-
General, ibid., 105-114.
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in the case of Le Louis in which it had been held that the slave trade
in its proper interpretation was not piracy. 00 Inr Marshall's opinion
slave trading could not be considered as piracy unless it was made
so by the treaties or statutes of the nation to whom the parties be-
longed."' The Chief Justice reasoned that no matter what might be
the answer of the moralist to the question whether slave trading was
piracy, yet the jurist must search for a legal-solution to such ques-
tions -and also must look to those principles of action which are sanc-
tioned by the usage, the national acts, and the general assent, of that
portion of the world of which he considers himself a part, and to
whose law the appeal is made202 "If we resort to this standard as
the test of international law, the question, as has already been ob-
served, is decided in favor of the legality" of the slave trade, and
naturally, by the law of nations that trade could not in any logical
sense be called piracy unless every state gave its consent.
This concludes our study of the cases before the Supreme Court
which have involved piracy. As has been noted, the majority of them
concerned the proper interpretation to be placed upon the Act of
Congress on piracy, and thus are of importance to constitutional rather
than to international law. In United States v. Smith, however, Jus-
tice Story declared that piracy depended both for its definition and
for its punishment "not upon the particular provision of any municipal
code, but upon the law of nations." Referring to English authorities
and cases he came to the conclusion that piracy was universally
treated as an offense against the law of nations, and that a true
definition of that law was robbery, or forcible depredations upon the
sea, animo furandi.
It is doubtful whether the Court would hold this view today, nor
is it considered a correct statement of the present international law
on piracy. In the first place piracy is not sufficiently defined by inter-
national law so that offenders may be prosecuted by reference to that
law alone. Justice Livingston's dissent in United States v. Smith
pointed out the fallacy in the majority opinion. Nor is piracy gen-
erally considered to be a crime against international law. Piracy is
an offense against the municipal law; international law enters into
the matter by condemning the practice and permitting the states to
exercise jurisdiction over piratical acts.
'0o2 Dods. 244, followed in 10 Wheat. 118-120.
QOlMarshall agreed that the African slave trade was contrary to the law of
nature, but thought that it was not prohibited by public international law. See
1 Warren, op cit., 584-586.
10210 Wheat. 121.
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As new offenses are added to the municipal law on piracy it is
quite probable that piracy cases will again appear before the Court.
It seems, moreover, that the Court will render its decisions by refer-
ence to this law. Only when there are lacunae or ambiguities in the
municipal law is the Court bound to look to international law for
rules, or for evidence as to the intention of the framers of the statute.
In some circumstances the Court follows the political depart-
ments on points important to its decision. Thus, if a vessel commis-
sioned by an insurgent or revolutionary group is captured as a pirate
ship, the Court will accept the view of the political departments as to
the status of the insurgents.
